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“Quantum conversation” is a way in which two parties can communicate classical information with
each other using entanglement as a shared resource. We present this scheme using a multipartite
entangled state after describing its generation through appropriate circuit diagrams. We make use
of a discrimination scheme which allows one to perform a measurement on the system without
destroying its entanglement. We later prove that this scheme is secure in a noiseless and a lossless
quantum channel.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography [1, 2, 3] is one of the significant applications of quantum information theory, which has also
been experimentally realized in various systems [4, 5]. It enables one to transmit secret messages between various
parties with unconditional security. Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [6] is an important branch of
quantum cryptography, which uses entanglement as a resource to transmit quantum information in a secure manner,
without establishing a random key. In recent years, several QSDC schemes, involving EPR pairs [7] and multiparticle
entangled channels [8, 9] have been investigated. Most of these protocols involve joint measurements to be carried
out on an entangled basis which is a non-trivial task. Instead, measurements on a product basis is often preferred
[10]. However, this disturbs the entanglement of the system and makes the state unusable for further applications.
Instead, approaches based on non-destructive discrimination (NDD) can be more useful as it enables discrimination
between orthogonal quantum states by allowing a product basis measurement without destroying the entanglement
of the system [11, 12, 13, 14].
Characterization of entanglement of greater than four qubits under LOCC is still an unsolved problem. However,
approaches based on numerical optimization procedures to find higher qubit entangled states have recently attracted
attention [15, 16, 17]. First such procedure was studied by Brown et al. [15], who arrived at a “highly entangled” five
qubit state given by,
|ψ5〉 =
1
2
(|001〉|φ−〉+ |010〉|ψ−〉+ |100〉|φ+〉+ |111〉|ψ+〉), (1)
where |ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉), |φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉) are the Bell states. This result was verified by yet another
numerical procedure carried out later [16]. This state is maximally “persistent” [18] and shows a high degree of
“connectedness” [19], which is an indication of genuine multiparticle entanglement. Further, it assumes the same
form for all ten (3 + 2) splits. It was shown that, |ψ5〉 can be used for perfect teleportation and state sharing of an
arbitrary two qubit state [20]. This state can also be physically realized in a cavity QED system, which is insensitive
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2to both cavity decay and thermal field [21]. The dense coding [22] capacity of this state reaches the “Holevo bound”,
thereby allowing the transmission of five classical bits using three qubits by consuming only two ebits of entanglement
[20]. In this paper, we use the dense coding protocol and an efficient NDD scheme to set up a quantum conversation
between two parties. We later prove that this protocol is secure under ideal conditions.
For the sake of completeness, we shall discuss the dense coding protocol using |ψ5〉 as a shared entangled resource
[20]. Initially Alice and Bob possess, the first three and the last two qubits of |ψ5〉 respectively. Suppose Alice has a
secret message “m1m2m3m4m5” where mi ∈ {0, 1} which she wants to send to Bob. To achieve this purpose, Alice
operates unitarily on her first three qubits as,
((ζ1.ζ2.ζ3.ζ4.ζ5)⊗ I⊗ I)|ψ5〉 = |ψ5〉m1m2m3m4m5 . (2)
ζ1 = σx ⊗ I ⊗ I, if m1 = 1, (3)
= I ⊗ I ⊗ I, if m1 = 0,
ζ2 = I ⊗ I ⊗ σx, if m2 = 1,
= I ⊗ I ⊗ I, if m2 = 0,
ζ3 = σz ⊗ σz ⊗ I, if m3 = 1,
= I ⊗ I ⊗ I, if m3 = 0,
ζ4 = σx ⊗ I ⊗ σx, if m4 = 1,
= I ⊗ I ⊗ I, if m4 = 0,
ζ5 = I ⊗ σx ⊗ σx, if m5 = 1,
= I ⊗ I ⊗ I, if m5 = 0.
For example, if Alice wants to send the 5 bit classical information ”10010” to Bob, the unitary operation that Alice
would apply on her qubits would be;
(((σx ⊗ I⊗ I)(I ⊗ I⊗ I)(I⊗ I⊗ I)(σx ⊗ I⊗ σx)(I⊗ I⊗ I))⊗ I⊗ I)|ψ5〉 = (|ψ5〉100010) (4)
After performing the unitary operations in the above stated manner, Alice sends the three qubits to Bob.Bob, on
receiving Alice’s qubits, performs a joint five partite von-Neumann measurement in the |ψ5〉m1m2m3m4m5 basis and
distinguishes these states, thereby obtaining the message encoded by Alice.
The present scheme for bidirectional “quantum conversation” consists of five main steps. In the first and the
second step, we generate the entangled state and initialize the protocol for a security check. In the third step, an
eavesdropper’s check on the multiqubit quantum channel is performed. Later, we propose a scheme to discriminate
between the 32 orthogonal |ψ5〉m1m2m3m4m5 states after implementing the dense coding protocol thereby allowing
the quantum conversation to be established. Subsequently, we check for the security of the presented protocol.
II. QUANTUM CONVERSATION
A. Generation and Initialization
Here, we describe an explicit circuit diagram for the generation of the Brown et al. state - a state which was
obtained only through numerical searches in the past. As is evident from Fig.1, by changing the input |00000〉 to a
different computational basis, 32 orthogonal Brown et al., can be obtained. The above circuit makes the Brown et
al., state experimentally realizable in NMR and quantum dot systems.
In our quantum conversation protocol, Alice first prepares an ordered sequence of N copies of the five qubit Brown
et al., state |ψ5〉: [(q
1
1 , q
1
2 , q
1
3 , q
1
4 , q
1
5)), (q
2
1 , q
2
2 ,......, q
N
5 ) ]. Here the subscripts represent five different qubits in |ψ5〉
and the superscripts indicate sequential ordering of the N different Brown et al., states. Alice then takes the same
one qubit from each |ψ5〉 to form five ordered sequences corresponding to the five qubits, generically written as,
Sk = [q
1
k, q
2
k, q
3
k....q
N
k ]. (5)
Subsequently, she keeps the particle sequences S1, S2, S3 and transmits the sequences S4 and S5 to Bob.
3FIG. 1: Circuit diagram for the generation of |ψ5〉
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9>>>>>>>>>>>=
>>>>>>>>>>>;
B. Measurement basis of Alice and Bob
Interestingly, the state |ψ5〉 can be written down in two different forms as:
|ψ5〉12345 =
1
2
(|001〉|φ−〉+ |010〉|ψ−〉+ |100〉|φ+〉+ |111〉|ψ+〉)12345, (6)
|ψ5〉13245 = ([|φ+〉|1〉+ |ψ+〉|0〉]|0+〉+ [|φ+〉|1〉 − |ψ+〉|0〉]|0−〉)13245 (7)
−[|φ−〉|1〉+ |ψ−〉|0〉]|1+〉+ [|φ−〉|1〉 − |ψ−〉|0〉]|1−〉.
Alice and Bob exploit this characteristic of |ψ5〉 to check the presence of an eavesdropper. It can be noted that if one
measures the qubits 4 and 5 by projection on the Bell basis, i.e., say BMB1 (Bob’s Measurement Basis-1), the first
three qubits of Alice would collapse into one of the computational basis (|001〉, |010〉, |100〉, |111〉)123
which now forms the corresponding basis of Alice’s measurement (AMB1). On the other hand, if the state
|ψ5〉 is written as in equation (7), it can be observed that if Bob measures his two qubits in the basis (BMB2):
|0+〉45, |0−〉45, |1+〉45, |1−〉45, corresponding Alice’s measurement basis (AMB2) would be:
(|φ+〉|1〉 + |ψ+〉|0〉)132, (|φ+〉|1〉 − |ψ+〉|0〉)132, (−|φ−〉|1〉 - |ψ−〉|0〉)132 and (|φ−〉|1〉 − |ψ−〉|0〉)132. Utilizing this
feature, Alice and Bob can design a defence strategy to guard against eavesdropping in the transmission. An explicit
description of this strategy is given below.
C. Eavesdropping check
Bob chooses randomly a sufficiently large subset (called the sample subset) of the pair of qubits 4 and 5 from the
sequences S4 and S5 and measures them either in the basis BMB1 or BMB2. He then tells Alice the position of
these pairs and the corresponding chosen measurement basis through a classical channel. Alice then measures the
set of qubits 1, 2, 3 from the sequences S1, S2, S3 in the corresponding basis AMB1 or AMB2. Finally Alice and
Bob check their measurement outcomes to find whether the quantum channel is altered. Later, they apply a majority
voting technique to determine the error rate. If it turns out to be considerably high, they discard the sample subset
and abort the protocol. Else, they will securely use the remaining entangled pairs of shared |ψ5〉 to communicate
their secret messages as in the next step.
D. Dense coding and NDD
The secret message “m1m2m3m4m5” is encoded by Alice in her three qubits by applying the corresponding local
unitary operations as in the dense coding protocol described earlier and sent to Bob. On receiving Alice’s qubits,
Bob applies non-destructive discrimination (NDD) on the five qubit Brown et al., state thus obtained and decodes
the message without disturbing the entanglement of the system. Inorder to achieve this, he operates on the system
through the circuit diagram shown in Fig.2, to discriminate between the 32 orthogonal Brown states non-destructively.
The outcome of the circuit with the input state as |ψ5〉m1m2m3m4m5 can be written in general as |ψ5〉x|x〉
where |x〉 is given by, |m1m2m3m4m5〉 and |ψ5〉x is given by, |ψ〉m1m2m3m4m5 . Thus, Bob now measures the
ancillas in the product basis and thereby obtains the classical message.
4FIG. 2: Circuit diagram for the non-destructive discrimination of |ψ5〉m1m2m3m4m5
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E. Establishment of quantum conversation
Bob now has all the five qubits of the entangled Brown state. Hence, he can encode his message in the first three
qubits by applying unitary operations, as was done earlier by Alice and send the five qubits to Alice in two sets of
(4,5) and (1,2,3). On receiving the entangled state Alice applies NDD circuit to obtain the secret information and
thus the process continues. Hence, the conversation is established.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Suppose Eve wants to attack the quantum channel and eavesdrop Alice’s secret message, thereby rendering the
protocol worthless. In the following section we show that the protocol is secure against an eavesdropper’s attack in
ideal conditions i.e., assuming no noises and losses in the quantum channel.
In our protocol, Eve does not have access to all the five qubits at the same time. If she attacks only the encoded
particles by Alice, she can gain partial information about the secret message, since the density matrix for Alice’s
system i.e., ρ =|001〉〈001| + |010〉〈010| + |100〉〈100| + |111〉〈111| is a mixed state, though not maximally mixed, as
expected in case of quantum channel with odd number of qubits. Hence, the attack strategy of Eve would be to
prepare an ancilla in the initial state |η〉, intercept the qubits 4 and 5 that are being transmitted by Alice to Bob and
make the ancilla interact with them using a unitary operation. Next, when the first three encoded qubits are sent to
Bob, Eve would capture the qubits and make a joint measurement on the encoded qubits and her ancillas. In this
way, Eve might obtain some information about Alice’s secret message.
Let the ancilla attached by Eve on the qubits 4 and 5 and the unitary operation performed by her be given by, |η〉
and U respectively. The operations that Eve can perform can be written in the most general form as,
U : |00, η〉 → |00, η00〉+ |01, η01〉+ |10, η02〉+ |11, η03〉 (8)
|01, η〉 → |00, η10〉+ |01, η11〉+ |10, η12〉+ |11, η13〉
|10, η〉 → |00, η20〉+ |01, η21〉+ |10, η22〉+ |11, η23〉
|11, η〉 → |00, η30〉+ |01, η31〉+ |10, η32〉+ |11, η33〉.
Here, |ηij〉, (i,j ∈ {0,1,2,3}) are pure ancilla states, uniquely determined by the unitary operator U. After the inter-
action, the quantum state can be rewritten as,
|ϕ〉 = [|φ+〉|1〉(|00, η00〉+ |01, η01〉+ |10, η02〉+ |11, η03〉) (9)
+|ψ+〉|0〉(|00, η10〉+ |01, η11〉+ |10, η12〉+ |11, η13〉)
−|ψ−〉|0〉(|00, η20〉+ |01, η21〉+ |10, η22〉+ |11, η23〉)
−|φ−〉|1〉(|00, η30〉+ |01, η31〉+ |10, η32〉+ |11, η33〉)]13245E
Since Bob has a choice of measuring in the basis i.e., BMB1, BMB2 the problem now breaks down into two cases.
In the first case, when Alice and Bob measure in the bases AMB1 and BMB1 respectively, the state can be written
5as,
|ϕ〉132E45 = (|µ1〉|φ+〉+ |µ2〉|ψ+〉+ |µ3〉|φ−〉+ |µ4〉|ψ−〉)132E45 (10)
where,
|µ1〉132E = (|φ+〉|1〉|η00〉+ |ψ+〉|0〉|η10〉 − |ψ−〉|0〉|η20〉 (11)
−|φ−〉|1〉|η30〉) + (|φ+〉|1〉|η03〉+ |ψ+〉|0〉|η13〉
−|ψ−〉|0〉|η23〉 − |φ−〉|1〉|η33〉),
|µ2〉132E = (|φ+〉|1〉|η01〉+ |ψ+〉|0〉|η11〉 − |ψ−〉|0〉|η21〉
−|φ−〉|1〉|η31〉) + (|φ+〉|1〉|η02〉+ |ψ+〉|0〉|η12〉
−|ψ−〉|0〉|η22〉 − |φ−〉|1〉|η32〉),
|µ3〉132E = (|φ+〉|1〉|η00〉+ |ψ+〉|0〉|η10〉 − |ψ−〉|0〉|η20〉
−|φ−〉|1〉|η30〉)− (|φ+〉|1〉|η03〉+ |ψ+〉|0〉|η13〉
−|ψ−〉|0〉|η23〉 − |φ−〉|1〉|η33〉),
|µ4〉132E = (|φ+〉|1〉|η01〉+ |ψ+〉|0〉|η11〉 − |ψ−〉|0〉|η21〉
−|φ−〉|1〉|η31〉)− (|φ+〉|1〉|η02〉+ |ψ+〉|0〉|η12〉
−|ψ−〉|0〉|η22〉 − |φ−〉|1〉|η32〉).
Comparing equation (8) with (4), we arrive at the following conditions, which should be satisfied in order to avoid
introducing error in the measurements:
〈001|µ1〉 = 〈100|µ1〉 = 〈111|µ1〉 = 0, (12)
〈111|µ2〉 = 〈001|µ2〉 = 〈010|µ2〉 = 0,
〈111|µ3〉 = 〈100|µ3〉 = 〈010|µ3〉 = 0,
〈111|µ4〉 = 〈001|µ4〉 = 〈100|µ4〉 = 0.
Solving the equations (9) and (10), we obtain the following conditions on the ancilla states.
|η00〉 = |η33〉, |η03〉 = |η10〉, (13)
|η22〉 = |η11〉, |η21〉 = |η12〉,
|η20〉 = |η23〉 = |η10〉 = |η13〉 = 0,
|η02〉 = |η01〉 = |η32〉 = |η31〉 = 0.
where 0 is a null ket.
Similarly, the second case is solved where Alice measures in the basis AMB2, and Bob measures in the basis BMB2
and the following constraints are obtained.
|η00〉 = |η22〉, |η13〉 = |η31〉, (14)
|η11〉 = |η33〉, |η02〉 = |η20〉,
|η01〉 = |η03〉 = |η21〉 = |η23〉 = 0,
|η10〉 = |η12〉 = |η30〉 = |η32〉 = 0.
Since both the cases must be satisfied, ancilla qubits must obey both equations (11) and (12) simultaneously. As
a result, the entire state reduces to, |ϕ〉 = |ψ5〉|η00〉E . From the above equation it is evident that the state |ϕ〉 is
reduced to a product of |ψ5〉 and the ancilla. This implies that Eve cannot gain any information about Alice’s secret
message by measuring the ancillas. Consequently, it can be deduced that the protocol is secure in the conditions,
where there are no losses or noises in the quantum channel.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have presented a secure “quantum conversation” (of classical information) scheme involving dense
coding through highly entangled five qubit states as the quantum channel. We describe appropriate circuits for the
generation of these states which were achieved only through numerical searches in the past. This was carried out
using NDD of 32 orthogonal Brown et al., states. We also constructed explicit circuit diagrams for the same. Later,
we proved that our schemes are secure to eavesdropper’s attack in ideal conditions. In future, we wish to make a
detailed analysis on the type of states that can be used for “quantum conversation” schemes.
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